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ACCOUNTANTS' FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND
FACT-FINDING IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE
REGULATION*
By HOMER KRIPKEt
THE accountant, traditionally portrayed as a modest clerk percled
on a high stool before a ponderous ledger, has emerged in recent years
as a man of professional stature with a unique importance in the business
community. Three broad stages mark the accountant's evolution from
scrivener to professional man. In the first stage, he appeared as the book-
keeper for a sole proprietor, recording such prosaic and incontrovertible
facts as arrival and shipment of goods, receipts and disbursements of
cash, and accounts receivable and payable. In the second stage, he was
the servant of business management, digging out the vital statistics of
the enterprise for its officers and directors and their commercial bankers.
Today the accountant has reached a third stage in his development:
he now deals with the financial statements of the large publicly-owned
corporations which have assumed major importance in our economy.
The gigantic aggregations of capital which these corporations bring
together have precipitated two problems of peculiar significance in the
evolution of the accountant's work. First, this capital has been invested
in land, buildings and heavy machinery, items enduring for many years
-unlike the short-lived items of cash, receivables, and inventories with
which the bookkeeper was once concerned. Such long-term assets require
allocation of depreciation expense over their life expectancies and neces-
sitate valuation at times when value may be far removed from cost.
Second, these large aggregations of capital, collected from diverse classes
of investors, present the problem of accounting for the contributions and
of defining the respective rights of each class - a problem never faced
by the bookkeeper of simpler business units. Thus, the accountant has
been thrust into the role of arbiter: he must delineate the rights of the
various groups interested in and affected by the corporate enterprise-
common stockholders, preferred stockholders, bondholders or debenture-
holders, and, in the case of public utilities, consumers. Under state and
federal security legislation, the accountant is, in effect, obligated to pro-
tect prospective investors against promoters, underwriters and existing
investors, and to afford existing investors security against corporate
insiders. These new burdens stem primarily from the fact that the appli-
cation of many legal rules governing the inter-relationships between these
* Nothing herein should be construed as expressing the opinion of the Securities and
Exchange Commission or of any member of its staff other than the writer.
t Senior Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission.
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interests largely depends on classification of business facts in terms of
accounting concepts.
Many such legal rules are found in the modern law of corporate dis-
tributions to security holders. Dividends, for example, may be paid only
out of "net profits" or out of an "excess of assets over liabilities plus
capital stock," both accounting concepts. Likewise, the classification of
stock as par or no par, the use of a low stated value with a high paid-in
surplus, the use of a high par value or a low par value combined vith
a large paid-in surplus - all these questions depend on legal or strategic
considerations which arise out of the same accounting concepts.' Again,
the payment of dividends on certain preferred stocks or the payment of
interest on the corporate income bond is dependent on the accountant's
determination of whether income has been earned. Similarly, the status
of bonds as legal investments for savings banks and trust funds turns
on whether the corporate income has afforded the necessary earnings
coverages.' Finally, the "voluntary reorganization" frequently takes the
form of a "quasi-reorganization," which, in effect, is nothing more than
a manipulation of accounts. The extent to wlich such an accounting
manipulation may legally occur, the extent to which it may have legal
consequences, and the extent to which it must be accompanied by legal
safeguards are some of the most rapidly developing problems of corpora-
tion law.3
Accounting concepts are no less significant when they appear as devices
of control in the public regulation of business. Apparently, the Interstate
Commerce Commission has made the right to issue securities under
Section 2 0(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act dependent on rules of
accounting.4 In order to protect investors, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has promoted standardization and reform of accounting
1. See BmE AND MEANS, THE IfODERN" CORPORATION AN PRVATE Popznn'
(1932) bk. II, cc. II and III; SEC Accounting Release No. 9, Dec. 23, 1938; Healy,
The Next Step iin Accounting (1938) 13 AcroT. RE%. 1; Werntz, Some Current Problems
in Accounting (1939) 14 AccTG. REv. 117.
2. On the income bond, see Hansen, Legal and Business Aspects of Income Bonds
(1937) 11 TEsm-. L. Q. 330; Dewing, The Position of Income Bonds as Illustrated by
Those of the Central of Georgia Railroad (1911) 25 Q. J. Ecoi. 396. For a similar
problem with reference to stock, see MacIntosh v. Flint & P. M. R. l, 34 Fed. 582
(C. C. E. D. Mich. 1888). On the earnings requirement for legal investments, see Wa-
bash Railway Income in 1930, SEN. REP. No. 25, pt. 23, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
3. See Matter of Kinney, 279 N. Y. 423, IS N. E. (2d) 645 (1939); Associated
Gas & Elec. Corp., 6 S. E. C. 605 (1940); New Mexico Gas Co., 6 S. E. C. 547
(1940); The Philadelphia Co., 6 S. E. C. 752 (1940); SEC Accounting Releases
Nos. 15 and 16, March 16, 1940; CoimurIEa ox Accou.TING ProCEDuRE, AmMCAM;
INSTITUTE OF AccOUXTANTS, ACCOUNwTING RESFEARCH BULLTIN No. 3 (1939); PATO.N
AND LITTL'0rx, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPOATE ACCOUNTING SrANu s (1940) 112
et seq.; Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1319; Werntz, supra note 1.
4. See Locx, REGULATION OF SEcuaRIY IssuEs BY THE INTERSTATE Co.,,_mcF
Comn ssioN (1925), particularly cc. IV, V and VII and pp. 85-87.
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practice,5 not merely because accounting manipulation is characteristic
of fraudulent stock-selling schemes,' but also because accounting con-
ventions underlie many of the business facts upon whose disclosure the
federal system of investor protection is based. So complete is the per-
meation of accounting concepts into the business fabric that prescription
of uniform systems of accounts is one of the most common regulatory
devices in the public control of enterprise.
It will be the purpose of this Article to explore two questions which
appear to be basic to the future cooperation of lawyers and accountants
in corporation law generally and in the domain of public regulation in
particular. The first is whether accounting principles which are used to
interpret business facts have independent validity in themselves or are
merely conventional techniques which should be adapted to the disclosure
of legally operative facts. Prominent in this controversy is the question
of whether financial statements should adhere to a cost basis, or should
attempt to disclose value, a factor more important than cost in the solution
of many legal problems. The second question to be explored is whether,
assuming that the financial statements do show legally significant facts
with respect to an enterprise, that enterprise and the persons with whom
it deals, including public agencies, are bound by the facts thus disclosed
or can successfully contend that the operative facts in issue differ ma-
terially from the facts disclosed by the accounts.
A. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN LEGAL
AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
The literature of legal-accounting problems is replete with discussion
of the extent to which accountants need recognize legal rules in the
preparation of financial statements. Reasoning purely a priori, the solu-
tion of this question seems to depend on the answer to the somewhat
philosophical question of whether accounting is a science or an art. If
it is a science in the sense that its principles have external validity, these
5. For cases under the Securities Act of 1933, see, e.g., Metropolitan Personal Loan
Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 2256, Aug. 23, 1940; The Republic Co., 6 S. E. C.
1062 (1940) ; cf. Potrero Sugar Co., 5 S. E. C. 982 (1939). For cases under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, see, e.g., A. Hollander & Son, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 2777, Feb. 6, 1941; Alleghany Corp., 6 S. E. C. 960 (1940); Missouri
Pac. R. R., 6 S. E. C. 268 (1939). See also Frank, The Sin of Perfectionism in ExERIaUNcEs
WITH ExTEtsioNs OF AUDITING PROCEDURE AND PAPERS ON OTHER ACCOUNTING SUB-
JEcTS (1940) ; Sanders, Accounting Aspects of the Securities Act (1937) 4 LAW & CON-
T11'. PROB. 191; Kaplan and Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to Stockholders, and the
SEC (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 935; Henderson, Practice under the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: From the Viewpoint of the Attorney (1934)
58 J. OF Accr. 448; Werntz, supra note 1.
6. See SEC REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES (1940)
pt. III, c. VI.
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principles should not be distorted to meet the exigencies of man-made
law. If, however, accounting is an art, a technique, it ought to be adapted
to the structure of law which governs the enterprises for which the
accountants account.
Leading accountants recognize that accounting is an art based on
conventions-not immutable principles - which are justified by their
utility proven in practice, not by their truth proven scientifically. Thus
the Committee on Terminology, American Institute of Accountants,
recently said:
"Initially, accounting rules are mere postulates derived from ex-
perience and reason. Only after they have proved useful, and become
generally accepted, do they become principles of accounting ...
An accounting principle is not a principle in the sense that it admits
of no variation, nor in the sense that it cannot conflict with other
principles.'
'
Most accountants acknowledge that accounting involves such substan-
tial elements of judgment that two equally reputable and competent
accountants may widely disagree as to the proper income statements
and balance sheets of the same enterprise. Such matters of choice and
discretion as the allocation of expenditures to capital account or to ex-
pense, the amortization or the writing off of debt discount and expense,
the use of "last in-first out" or "last in-last out" as a basis for inventory
valuation, and the selection of depreciation formulae, allow much latitude
to corporate managements and their accountants in shaping financial
statements.
Nonetheless, many accountants argue that this selective process need
not be influenced by applicable legal considerations.' Lawyers, conversely,
are quite convinced that accountants must heed legal rules0 - and some
7. COMmTrEE ON ACCOUNTING REsEARCu, AmIERICAN IlsTrLurc or AccouxrA:Tzs,
AccouNTING REsAgcH Bu~msr No. 7 (1940). See also Freeman, Accounting Prig-
ciples and the Law (1934) 57 J. OF Accry. 467, 469; May, The Influence of 4ccount-
ing on the Development of an Economy (1936) 61 J. OF Acc-. 11, 13; May, Uniformfity
in Accounting (1938) 17 HAnv. Bus. Rxv. 1. For an even more objective approach, see
Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for Price (1937) 4 LAw & Co.'rmP. Pro. 321.
8. Thornton, Accounting Principles and Local Statutes (1934) 57 J. ow Accr.
302; Thornton, Law and Accounting (1933) 56 J. or AccTy. 151; Paton, Shortcomings
of Present Day Financial Statements (1934) 57 J. op Accry. 103; Clader, Prin-
ciples Related to Earned Surplus, in PAPERS ON AccOuNTING P=CEcLw.Es AzD Pron-
uR (1938) 36, 37. Compare PATON AND LrrrLToN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 4, 106,
with the doubts as to the position there taken expressed by a subcommittee of the Amer-
ican Institute of Accountants (1941) 71 J. OF Accry. 43, 57. See also the somewhat un-
certain positions taken in Bowles, Treasury Shares on the Balance Sheet (1934) S J.
oir Accry. 98; Wakefield, When Lawyers and Accountants Disagree (1934) 53 J. o,-
Acct. 117.
9. Hills, Stated Capital and Treasury Shares (1934) 57 J. OF Accr. 202, 472;
Hills, Accounting in Corporation Law (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rv'. 494, 501; Hills, Federal
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accountants side with the lawyers."0 This conflict can best be illustrated
in terms of the example which is most discussed in the literature: the
accounting treatment of the acquisition of a corporation's own shares.
The most prevalent accounting treatment is, or at least was, to show the
cost of the shares acquired as a deduction from the capital account, on
the theory that reduction of capital is the practical and economic conse-
quence of the purchase. But most modern writers now recognize that,
without formal legal steps, the stated capital of the company is not
reduced by the acquisition; the legal effect of the transaction is to reduce
surplus, and any form of accounting which fails to present the legal
realities is misleading, and may impose liability on the officers and direc-
tors11 - and even the accountants.' Accordingly, accounting practice
is moving toward a presentation of treasury stock as a deduction from
surplus, or from the sum of stated capital and surplus.
Such an attitude apparently assumes that a primary responsibility of
accounting is to state correctly the corporate legal obligations with respect
to the capital and surplus accounts, and particularly, not to state earned
surplus in an amount greater than is legally available for dividends."b
This aspect of accounting responsibility has not often been articulated
because, ordinarily, this function of the accountant is automatically per-
formed by a statement of income and surplus accounts according to
established accounting conventions. But there is other evidence of its
recognition in practice.' 4
Taxation vs. Corporation Law (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rv. 280, 306; Katz, Accounting
Problems in Corporate Distributions (1941) 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 764; Lewis, Some
Legal and Accounting Questions Presented by the Michigan General Corporation Act
(1933) 8 AccTG. REv. 145.
10. MARPLE, CAPITAL SURPLUS AND CORPORATE NET WORTH (1936) 45; Watson,
Principles Related to Treasury Stock, in PAPERS ON ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND PRO-
CEDURE (1938) 31, 32; Freeman, Accounting Principles and the Law (1934) 57 J. oF
Accr. 467; Herrick, Law and Accounting (1933) 56 J. OF AccTy. 148; Marple, Treas-
ury Stock (1934) 57 J. OF Accrv. 257; Payne, Net Worth under the Delaware and
Michigan Corporation Laws (1933) 8 AccTG. REv. 1; Payne, Accounting as Affected by
the New Illinois and Pennsylvania Corporation Acts (1933) 13 CERTiFtED Punic Ac-
COUNTANT 669.
11. See Freeman, Herrick and Payne, supra note 10; Hills and Lewis, supra note
9; Marple, Treasury Stock (1934) 57 J. OF Accs. 257.
12. Lewis, supra note 9, at 151-59.
13. There may be some question whether accountants should be bound to disclose
restrictions on dividends arising from contractual rather than statutory limitations on
surplus. The text is stated in terms of a duty not to overstate surplus; accountants
would recognize no obligation not to understate surplus available for dividendi, e.g.,
by failing to disclose a potential revaluation surplus.
14. See Foster, The Application of Accounting Concepts to Legal Standards (1938)
13 OHIo 0. 62, 65-66. The duty of accountants to disclose the legal situation con-
cerning dividends seems to have been an underlying postulate of many of the view-
points on accounting disclosure expressed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
and its staff; e.g., their emphasis on balance sheet disclosure of the liquidating prefer-
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While the legal situation should not, therefore, be ignored, accountants
who insist that the law cannot justify departures from accounting prin-
ciples in financial statements do have a plausible argument: the explication
of economic facts in a financial statement is a function of the con-
ventions on which that statement is based. Even though these conven-
tions have not achieved complete uniformity, a certain degree of stand-
ardization already achieved has made for the ready analysis of financial
statements. Consequently, if variations in law from state to state were
permitted to destroy the existing uniformity of conventions, the present
utility of financial statements would be gravely impaired. Any departure
from standard conventions, whether or not justified under state law,
even with the clearest explanation may be deceptive and render the finan-
cial statements useless as a basis for making comparisons with other
enterprises.
Without attempting finally to decide whether accounting principles
have such independent validity or utility that financial statements may
be prepared in reliance upon them, legal concepts to the contrary not-
withstanding, it seems probable that there is a compromise course which
is preferable and practicable in almost every case. Where the law is such
that financial statements prepared according to accounting principles do
not reveal legally significant information, accounting techniques permit
compromise by a presentation which discloses both the legal facts and
the facts as they would be stated under currently recognized accounting
principles. In practice, such techniques are evolving at many points. Thus,
a short time after a quasi-reorganization has been legally accomplished,
an enterprise may have an earned surplus legally available for dividends,
although by ordinary accounting standards the results of operations over
its life span may have left no surplus available. In such a case both the
legal situation and the deviation from basic accounting standards may
be revealed by dating the earned surplus account subsequent to the reor-
ganization.'5 Again, where preferred stock with a very small par value
is issued at a price which creates a large capital surplus- the liquidating
preference approximating the entire consideration received by the cor-
poration- the accounting convention of carrying stock at par value in
the balance sheet would not disclose a possible equitable restriction on
the availability for dividends of the surplus which arises out of the
disparity between the par value and the liquidating preference. Hence,
ence and issue price of preferred stock. These amounts may be so greatly in evcess of
par or stated value as to raise problems as to the legal availability of surplus for divi-
dends. The Commission requires an opinion of counsel as to the availability of divi-
dends. SEC Accounting Release No. 9, Dec. 23, 1938. See Werntz, Footnotes and Finan-
cial Statements (address May 3 and 9, 1939) ; Lewis, supra note 9.
15. See COMMITTEE ON ACCOUiNTING PRoc anu, Ama=eAN I.srtnTuTE or AccoU;T-
AxTs, ACCOUNTING RESFAR cH BuLLErri No. 3 (1939); SEC Accounting Release No.
15, March 16, 1940.
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the better practice is to supplement the standard accounting presentation
with a disclosure of the amount of the liquidating preference coupled
with a legal opinion as to the availability of dividends."' Again, in states
where revaluation surplus is legally available for dividends, such a surplus
can be displayed by a technique which reveals both the accountant's
traditional cost-less-depreciation basis and the appraised value reflected
on the corporation's books. Where dividends may be paid out of earn-
ings for the current and next preceding years without regard to the
existence of a deficit,' 7 surplus and deficit accounts may be presented so
as to show clearly both the overall deficit and the earnings available for
dividends for the current and preceding years. The solution in each case
lies in the development of accounting techniques which disclose both the
legal status of the capital and surplus accounts and their status according
to accepted accounting principles. Both aspects of this disclosure are
of fundamental importance to investors.'8 Accountants who insist on
presenting their own principles without regard to the legal considera-
tions lose sight of the function of accounting as an art designed to tell
people what they need to know.
B. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS BASED ON THE COST CONVENTION
AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF VALUATION
Extensive controversy has revolved around the contention that ac-
countants are not revealing legally significant facts because they persist
in adhering to their convention of carrying fixed assets on the balance
sheet at cost. In view of the importance of the cost convention in the
structure of the accountant's financial statements, this contention puts
at issue the ultimate utility of accounting concepts in the solution of
legal problems:
1. Nature of Financial Statements Based on the Cost Convention. It is
commonly assumed that the accountant's balance sheet is an instantaneous
photograph of the financial condition of a business at a given point of
time, and that his income (or profit and loss) statement is a picture of
the results of business operations between two such points of time.
But such generalizations are descriptive, not analytic; they distinguish
the accountant's statements from each other, but indicate nothing specific
about their respective contents.
16. SEC Accounting Release No. 9, Dec. 23, 1938.
17. See DEL. REv. CODE (1935) c. 65, § 2066.
18. This solution may not be practicable in every instance. Some writers believe
that dividend law has grown so complex that it is not possible to show a balance sheet
figure for surplus which represents legally distributable surplus. SANDLmS, HATFIELD
AND MOORE, A STATEMENT or ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (1938) 93; Henderson, supra
note 5, at 448, 454; Littleton, Dividends Presuppose Profits (1934) 9 Accra. Ray. 304;
cf. PATON AND LITrTLEON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 106.
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For present purposes, the outstanding characteristic of the conven-
tional balance sheet is the general use of cost as a basis for recording
fixed assets, with appropriate deductions for depreciation. Broadly speak-
ing, no appreciation or decline in asset value is recorded until realized by
a sale. A reserve for depreciation is shown for depreciable items; the
annual accretion to this reserve has its counterpart in an annual charge
for depreciation expense in the income statement to record the pro tanto
exhaustion of the utility of the assets during the year. The sum of the
annual charges during the life of the asset will theoretically equal cost less
salvage value. Thus, the successive income statements distribute the entire
net cost as expense over the life of the asset, and the depreciation reserve
is eventually sufficient to retire the asset from the balance sheet. It follows
that the balance sheet at the end of any accounting period shows the por-
tion of cost which has not yet been charged to operations, and does not
purport to show value. Consequently, the characterization of a balance
sheet as a "statement of condition" is misleading if that phrase is taken
to mean a representation as to value.
Because the balance sheet based on the cost convention does not in
fact show value, its advocates have been perennially criticized. Although
the proponents of balance sheets based on value gained ground in the
'twenties,'9 by the middle 'thirties their gains had been irretrievably lost,
partly by reason of the gross errors and abuses which had occurred in
write-ups and write-downs of value for income-puffing and security-
selling purposes.2 Consequently, the cost convention remains the funda-
mental concept of accounting.
The accountant is not necessarily wrong, however, in adhering to the
cost principle, and he need not seek justification on the unconvincing
brounds that cost is the best and only non-speculative evidence of value
available,2 or that cost is "going concern value."2' A better justification
is that value is not an accounting concept23 and the accountant's job is
19. See table indicating the enormous number of write-ups and write-downs between
1925 and 1934 in 272 large industrial corporations studied, prepared from a study by
Solomon Fabricant, in Com-rrTEL oN AccOUNTING PRocauRi, A snTc%. I:,STIUTN
OF ACCOUNTAN"S, ACCOUNTING REsEARCE BUL.ETIN No. 5 (1940). See also Graham,
Vahation for Profit Determination (1940) 15 AccTG. Rnv. 145.
20. See PATON AND LrrTLFoN, op cit. supra note 3, 122 ct seq.; SAzDmsns, HATFEL.
AND MoonE, A STATEaENT OF ACCOuNTING PRia-cxpL.s (1938) 58-59, 63; Daniels, Prin-
ciples of Asset Valtation (1934) 9 AccG. REv. 114; Paton, Accounting Problems of the
Depression (1932) 7 AccTG. REV. 258; May, The Influence of Accounting on Ile Devel-
opment of an Economy (1936) 61 J. OF Accr. 11, 15-16; A Tentative Statement of
Accounting Principles Affecting Corporate Reports (1936) 11 Accro. REv. 187.
21. Kelley, "Value" as an Accounting Concept (1935) 60 J. OF Accry. 50.
22. Daniels, Priciples of Asset Valuation (1934) 9 AccTG. Rnv. 114.
23. PATON Am LrrrLNroN, op. cit. stpra note 3, at 10-12; Littleton, Value and Price
in Accounting (1929) 4 AccTO. REv. 147; .May, The Influence of Accounting on the
Development of an Economy (1936) 61 J. oF AcTY. 11, 15; Peloubet, Is ['alue an Ac-
counting Concept? (1935) 59 J. OF Accry. 201, 60 J. OF Accr'. 53.
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not one of valuation. His function is to account for the funds expended
in the business. To him an asset used in production or distribution is
merely a prepaid expense like insurance or rent; balance sheet assets
(other than cash and its equivalents) are merely records of costs incurred
and not yet charged to operations. 24
2. The Utility in the Law of Balance Sheets Based on Cost. But
the question still remains as to whether the use of the cost convention
rather than value in the balance sheet has not impaired the usefulness
of the accountant's work for many legal purposes. Both law and ac-
counting make use of certain important concepts- net worth, assets,
capital, income, surplus, depreciation, and the like. Consequently, it is
frequently assumed and asserted that the law follows accounting rules.
2
6
Yet the balance sheet often is not directly useful in the solution of legal
problems, because the meaning of familiar terms in the balance sheet
based on the cost convention is not the meaning which the law gives to
them.20
(a) Dividends. Weiner and Bonbright 27 have pointed out that legal
rules concerning dividends have evolved in American statutes and cases
in two major patterns. Under the "net profits rule," dividends may be
paid only out of earned but undistributed profits. Under the "capital-
impairment rule," dividends may be paid out of any excess of the value
of assets over liabilities plus capital stock. Under the latter rule dividends
may be paid only if capital will not thereby be impaired. 28  Thus, the
24. SANDERS, HATFIELD AND MOORE, A STATEMENT OF AcCOUNTING PRINCIPLFS
(1938) 58-59; Paton, Economic Theory in Relation to Accounting Valuations (1931) 6
AccT. REv. 89.
25. "The principles developed by accountants will be adopted by the law tomor-
row." Fisher, Legal Regulation of Accounting (1933) 55 J. OF Accrv. 9. See Berle,
Accounting and the Law (1938) 65 J. OF Accrv. 368; Berle and Fisher, Elements of
the Law of Business Accounting (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 573; Fisher, The Integration
of Legal and Accounting Concepts, in PAPERS ON ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND PRO-
covuRE (1938) 49; Hills, Accounting in Corporation Law (1937) 12 Wis. L. REv. 494.
26. An exception is the field of income taxation. Even though some accounting con-
cepts are modified by the income tax laws, concepts based on the cost convention are
extremely important in taxation: e.g., the concepts of realization of profit, cost as the
starting point of "basis," and depreciation based on amortization of cost. See 2 BoN-
BRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) c. XXVIII; Hills, Federal Taxation vs. Cor-
poration Law (1937) 12 Wis. L. REv. 280.
27. Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law: The English Cases (1928)
28 COL. L. REv. 1046; Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Lawo: American Statutes
and Cases (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 461; Weiner and Bonbright, Theory of Anglo-Afner-
ican Dividend Law: Surplus and Profits (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 330, 954. Weiner,
The Amount Available for Dividends Where No-Par Shares Have Been Issued (1929)
29 COL. L. REv. 906. These articles are summarized in 2 BONIIRIGir, VALUATION OV
PROPERTY (1937) c. XXVIL
28. Recent writers have pointed out that the use of no par and low par value stock,
and the accompanying development of paid-in surplus, have impaired the usefulness of
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"net profits rule' places particular emphasis on events which the account-
ant records in his income statements - the net results of operations over
the history of an enterprise. In contrast, the "capital-impairment rule"
apparently emphasizes the value of an enterprise at a given point of time
-the information supposed to be revealed by the accountant's balance
sheet as traditionally understood. Applied literally, the "capital-impair-
ment rule" would take account of unrealized appreciation; the "net profits
rule" would not.
Although recognizing that the status of the law was uncertain, Weiner
and Bonbright were of the opinion that the courts have not realized
that their two verbalizations embody separate rules having different con-
sequences. These writers contended that the courts have really assimilated
these two rules into one, that of net profits.2 This has been accomplished
by adopting for dividend purposes the accountant's rule of "valuing"
assets-a rule which refuses to value assets on any basis other than
cost80 - with the result that the surplus account contains only those
realized earnings which are recognized by the accountant. To the extent
that the courts in fact follow this standard, no matter how verbalized,
the accountant's income statements, summarized in the earned surplus
caption of the balance sheet, guide the lawyer in respect to the legality
of dividend payments.
But, in a recent New York case,"' a statute framed in "capital-impair-
ment" terms was held to require determination of value at the time of
each dividend declaration rather than acceptance of the accountant's book
figures. Other cases likewise suggest that value rather than the account-
ant's figures may be decisive in dividend litigation, particularly before
judges unfamiliar with these mixed legal and accounting conceptsY3
the old tests. Suggestions are made for formulation of tests based on ratios of assets to
liabilities. See Littleton, Business Profits as a Legal Basis for Ditidends (1937) 16
HAv. Bus. REv. 51; Littleton, A Substitute for Stated Capital (1938) 17 HAR%. Bus.
Rxv. 75; Hills, Model Corporation Act (1935) 48 H~av. L. Ray. 1334; cf. C... Civ.
CODE (Deering, 1937) § 348(b) ; N. C. CoDn ANN. (Michie, 1939) § 1179.
29. They cite Bank of Morgan v. Reid, 27 Ga. App. 123, 107 S. E. 555 (1921) and
American Steel & Wire Co. v. Eddy, 130 Mich. 266, 89 N. W. 952 (1902) as examples of
interchangeable use of the two rules.
30. See So. Calif. Home Bldr's v. Young, 45 Cal. App. 679, 188 Pac 586 (192-0);
Kingston v. Home L. Ins. Co. of America, 11 Del. Ch. 258, 101 At. 893 (1917); Sex-
ton v. Percival Co., 189 Iowa 586, 177 N. W. 83 (1920); Coleman v. Booth, 268 Mo.
64, 186 S. W. 1021 (1916); Wilson v. Barnett, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 2, 1928, 1870 (Sup.
Ct., 1st Dep't) ; Hutchinson v. Curtiss, 45 Misc. 484, 92 N. Y. Supp. 70 (1904); Hill
v. International Products Co., 129 Misc. 25, 220 N. Y. Supp. 711, 751 (1925), affd wila-
out opinion, 226 App. Div. 730, 233 N. Y. Supp. 784 (1929).
31. Randall v. Bailey, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 173 (Sup. Ct., 1st Dep't 1940), (1940) 50
YALE L. J. 306.
32. E.g., Titus v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 2 Tenn. App. 184 (1925), w here it was held
that although unrealized appreciation might not be used as a source of dividends, it
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Under such decisions, the accountant's traditional balance sheet founded
on the cost convention is of slight value in dividend law. And confusion
of theories regarding the availability of dividends will persist unless
lawyers and accountants are careful to recognize the differences in mean-
ing which they respectively attribute to the same terms.
(b) Value in Public Utility Regulation. So long as Smyth v. Anes"
is Scripture, 4 public utility rate regulation will purportedly be concerned
with value, not with cost. Hence, financial statements founded on systems
of accounts prescribed by regulatory bodies and based on cost, perforce,
cannot control in such litigation. As a result, a public utility executive
was able to say:
" . . . the most unfortunate feature of regulation in this country
is that the book values of operating companies are totally unrelated
to the legal values under which these companies operate, sell their
electricity, and do their business. In other words, you have got a
value on your books that has nothing to do with the income you
can earn."
85
Cost is nonetheless one of the "elements" of value recognized in Smyth
v. Anies, and state commissions tend to give it as much weight as they
dare in rate base determinations.3" But to the extent that the law is still
based on value rather than cost, the accountant's financial statements
will play a minor role in rate litigation.
The specific issue of the amount of depreciation, like the general
problem of the rate base, is treated by the courts in terms of value rather
than accounting language. For the accountant a reserve for depreciation,
in harmony with his other book figures, shows the extent to which cost
has been amortized by charges to earnings, not the extent to which value
might be used to absorb losses, thereby permitting dividends to be paid out of realized
profit.
33. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
34. Some persons believe that the changed composition of the Supreme Court and
the following cases foreshadow the demise of Smyth v. Ames: R R. Comm. of Cali-
fornia v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 302 U. S. 388 (1937); McCart v. Indianapolis
Water Co., 302 U. S. 419 (1938); Driscoll v. The Edison Light & Power Co., 307
U. S. 104, rehearing denied, 307 U. S. 650 (1939). Presumably the rule of Smyth v.
Ames would be succeeded by the principle of returns on "prudent investment." See the
dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 276 (1923).
35. Floyd L. Carlisle, Chairman of Niagara Hudson Power Corp., quoted in tes-
timony of Leland Olds in Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of
the Tennessee Valley Authority, pt. 13, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 5803.
36. Compare R. R. Comm. of California v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 302 U. S. 388
(1938) with Los Angeles Gas Co. v. R. R. Comm. of California, 289 U. S. 287 (1932).
See Northwestern Power Co., Fed. Power Comm. Opinion No. 56, Dec. 6, 1940, where
the utility wanted to reaccount for cost on its books because of the increased importance
of cost in rate regulation.
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has diminished." But it is obvious that a balance sheet in which the
reserve for depreciation reflects amortization of cost will not be con-
clusive in matters involving depreciation in value.
It was to be expected, therefore, that in determining accrued deprecia-
tion for purposes of fixing the rate base the Supreme Court would reject
formulae for amortizing costas or the book accounts for depreciation
reserve,s' and would lean toward the "observational method", under
which the appropriate depreciation reserve is determined by inspecting
the property to compare its condition and value with that of a new plant."'
Hence, so long as the rate base depends on value, the litigated cases will
discuss depreciation in terms of value, not cost,41 and the accountant's
balance sheet will be of little assistance.
(c) Regulation of Security Issues under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act. In the light of the limited importance of the cost concept
in the dividend and rate fixing situations, it might be expected that
balance sheets would be given scant attention in determining the sound-
ness of security issues, where safety lies in value, not in cost. But ex-
perience has proved the contrary to be true. Recent opinions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 illustrate the persistence of value terminology
in balance sheet analysis, with resulting semantic difficulties, even among
persons who know that balance sheets record cost, not value. The
Commission has consistently found it necessary to eliminate appraisal
write-ups from property accounts, in order to reduce these accounts, and
the balance sheet in general, to a cost basis.' This policy reflects recog-
nition of the principle that "the purpose of accounting is to account,
not to present opinions of value." 4  Undoubtedly, the Commission realizes
37. See 1 BONERIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 185.
38. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U. S. 403 (1924); McCardle v.
Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926); cf. United Railways and Elec. Co. v.
West, 280 U. S. 234 (1930). See Haun, Inconsistencies in Public Utility Depreciation;
Deduction of Depreciation for Rate Base Purposes (1940) 38 Mcn. L REv. 479.
39. West Y. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662 (1935). Compare Board
of Public Utility Commrrs v. New York Tel. Co., -71 U. S. 23 (1926) with Lindheimer v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151 (1934).
40. The writer does not suggest that the "observational method," as ordinarily
employed, is accurate even on a "value" theory. Observational methods will not disclose
loss of service life, and hence, loss of value. See 1 BOXBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROP-
ERTY (1937) 204-05.
41. But see Mr. justice Brandeis dissenting in United Railways & Elec. Co. v.
\West, 280 U. S. 234 (1930) to the effect that depreciation charges should be based on
cost even when Smyth v. A-ics controls the determination of value.
42. E.g., Community Power & Light Co., 6 S. E. C. 182, 201 (1939); Central Ill.
Elec. and Gas Co., 5 S. E. C. 115 (1939): Public Serv. Co. of Colorado, 5 S. E. C. 788
(1939) ; _Middle West Corp., 7 S. E. C. 566 (1940); Appalachian Elec. Power Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 2430, Dec. 14, 1940.
43. Healy, The Next Step in Accounting (1938) 13 ALLTc. Rv. 1, 0.
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that a balance sheet stated at cost does not show the present values of
properties. Nevertheless, in considering applications and declarations
under Sections 6, 7 and 11 of the Act," the Commission has used
language which seems to assume that property accounts thus adjusted
to cost indicate value for the purpose of determining the soundness
of security issues.
A recent example is Community Power and Light Company," a case
involving not only the issuance of securities but the question of whether
sufficient value existed to entitle common shareholders to participate in
a reorganization. In its opinion, the Commission first pointed out that
on the basis of book figures there was an equity for the common stock;
then, by eliminating revaluation write-ups, it said that on the basis of
cost figures, there was no equity for this stock. From this part of the
Commission's opinion an uninformed reader might reasonably assume
that book figures corrected to show cost were significant in determining
the existence of an equity; otherwise, he might perceive no purpose in
the elimination of the write-ups. But, in contrast to its own demonstra-
tion that there appeared to be no value by the test of cost, the Com-
mission concluded that the existence of residual earnings for the common
stock demonstrated that there was sufficient value. If, however, on the
basis of earning power, there was an excess of value over cost, the
existence of such an excess tended to support the company's revaluation
-thus invalidating the Commission's assumption that these writeups
had to be eliminated for valuation purposes.
Newport Electric Corporation" and Public Service Company of
Colorado47 similarly appear to have used book values as indicia of value,
with the not surprising result that the conclusion based on book value
was contradicted by more apposite evidence. The Commission said in
the Newport case:
" . . . the common stock equity in the net tangible property per
books amounted to approximately $575,000. . . . On these bases
the proposed price of $1,756,725 for the common stock appears
high but in relation to the earnings record of the company . . .
it appears not unreasonable." 48
And in the Public Service Company case the Commission said:
"Declarant's record of earnings and dividends . indicates
that the equity is more substantial than might appear by merely
subtracting total inter-company appreciation from book figures and
44. For a general disctssion of the Commission's regulatory functions under these
sections, see Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 492.
45. 6 S. E. C. 182, 201 (1939).
46. 4 S. E. C. 999 (1939).
47. 5 S. E. C. 788 (1939).
48. 4 S. E. C. 999, 1017 (1939).
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comparing the difference with the face value of securities to be held
by the public."
' 49
It is possible that the Commission, or some of its members, actually
intend to hold that public utility property should be capitalized only to
the amount of its book value after squeezing out write-ups. This would
accord with a position taken by some state commissions.' 0 It might be
said in justification of such a position that if and when Smyth v,. Ames
is finally overruled, historical cost or some similar test may become the
measure of the rate base. If so, rates will be fixed so as to earn a fair
return on cost; consequently, cost will tend to approximate value.'
Finally, it may be argued that if any value above cost resulting from
excess earning capacity is shown on the balance sheet, it is preferable
that it be shown under some such caption as "goodwill", rather than
concealed by purported revaluation of the physical assets themselves.
Up to the present time this question seems never to have been squarely
presented to the Commission, partly because many of the revaluations
recorded on utility company books in the 'twenties were arbitrary or
based on intra-system transactions, and consequently are not now seri-
ously defended as estimates of value. As yet the Commission has never
refused to approve a utility issue because of insufficient asset cover-
age;52 so whether or not insufficient asset coverage on the basis of cost
figures could be obviated by proof of higher enterprise value has not
become an acute question. The present writer, however, hazards the
guess that when the Securities and Exchange Commission is squarely
presented with such a situation, it will not fail to recognize that a balance
sheet based on cost is a record, not a statement of financial condition,
and as such does not in itself show the value upon which the safety of
a security issue depends. It is hoped that the Commission will soon
abandon the language which treats cost as direct evidence of value, and
state more precisely the real reason for its discussion of original cost
in opinions dealing with security issuance- namely, that the influence
of original cost on the rate base may affect value.
Once it is clearly recognized that book values do not purport to be
representations of present values, much of the motive for recording
49. 5 S. E. C. 788, 820-21 (1939).
50. See In re Pittsburgh Rys., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. t 52821 (Penn. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 1940) ; Re California Water Service Co., P. U. R. 1928C 516 (Cal. Ry. Comm.);
cf. Healy, Financing the Utility Property Account, an appendix to RerorT OF THE CO'IM.
ox CoP. Fix. OF THE NAfL Ass'x OF R. R. AND UTIL. Co,. i'Rs (1940).
51. In fact, one member of the Commission has recognized the importance of cost in
security regulation from this point of view. See the concurring opinion of former Chair-
man, now Circuit Judge, Frank in Central Ill. Elec. and Gas Co., 5 S. E. C. 115, 134
(1939).
52. But cf. Federal Water Service Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
2635, March 24, 1941.
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appraisal values on corporate books will be eliminated. Thus, it will no
longer be necessary to use appraisal write-ups "to balance security
issues."" In one sense, the write-up has never been necessary to
"balance" an issue sold for cash, for the issue is balanced by its proceeds,
or' the property in which the proceeds are invested. Of course, the
"balancing" refers to past practice of writing up the property mort-
gaged as security for a bond issue to the point where it appeared to be
adequate security, or to the practice of writing up the total assets to the
point where there appeared to be an adequate margin of equity invest-
ment to safeguard an unsecured debt or preferred stock. But only so
long as balance sheet figures are regarded as estimates of value is
"balancing" necessary. When it is realized that they are based ol cost,
not value, the motive to distort the accounting records for valuation
purposes will in large measure disappear.5
4
3. The Cost Convention in the Ascertainment of Enterprise Value.
What has been said thus far demonstrates that, inasmuch as the account-
ant's balance sheet is based on cost, it does not adequately answer legal
questions concerned with value. But this does not mean that accountants
are not justified in adhering to the cost convention. Paradoxically enough,
financial statements are more useful in determining enterprise value
when they reflect asset cost rather than when they reflect asset value.
It is apparent that a balance sheet in which the individual assets are
stated on a cost basis rather than on a value basis affords no guide
to enterprise value." But this would be equally true of a balance sheet
which purported to show the values of the assets separately. George 0.
May has well stated the reasoning:
"Turning now to the objection that if balance-sheets do not reflect
values they ought to do so, because that is what the investor is
interested in - a number of minor exceptions to the position thus
asserted might be taken, but the answer to the objection is that
. . . the figures would be of no real interest to the investor if they
could be ascertained.
" . . what the investor or speculator is interested in is the
value of the business as a whole, and that is dependent mainly on
53. See the remarks of Commissioner Healy in Central Ill. Elec. and Gas Co., 5 S.
E. C. 115, 127-29 (1939), and in Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado, 5 S. E. C. 788, 837, 850-51
(1939).
54. It is suggested in Fryxsell, Should Appreciation be Brought into the Acouints?
(1930) 5 AccT. IEv. 157, that the balance sheet be stated on a cost basis, with repre-
sentations as to value in the prospectus. Other accountants assume that revaluations
showing present value are necessary to support security issues. 2 KESmn, AccouNTIN
THEORY AND PRAcricE (3d rev. ed. 1933) 104.
55. ". . . but there is nothing in the statistical procedure of the accountant that im-
plies either that these valuations are capital valuations or that the sum of them bears any
simple relation to the capitalized value of a concern's earning power," Canning, Some Di-
vergences of Accounting Theory from Economic Theory (1929) 4 Accra. Rzv. 1, 6.
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what it will produce in the future and is not determinable by any
purely accounting process. Not only so, but if the accountant were
to assume the task of valuing the business as a whole, he would
have met the assumed need, and it would be entirely supererogatory
for him to attempt to allocate that value as between the different
assets of the business."
' 0
May concludes that the greatest service which the accountant can
refder to a person desiring to know value is to shed light on earning
capacity, and that this can best be done by ignoring fluctuations in the
values of capital assets. This thesis has a sound economic basis: enter-
prise value is a summation of the present worth of future anticipated
earnings.5 7 As this fact gains recognition, the income statement becomes
the account to which the investor attaches the greatest significance.'
Emphasis in accounting, therefore, shifts from accuracy of balance sheet
account totals to accuracy of income recording.
Accounting procedure will reflect income most accurately if it ignores
fluctuations in the value of assets. A fixed asset, not for sale, but to
be used in production, cannot produce income except as its use in pro-
duction creates a flow of assets back to the enterprise. Therefore, no
income results from appreciation in value of production goods, except
in so far as that appreciation is reflected in the prices realized from
finished goods sold. 9
It is sometimes argued that since the effective price determinants are
current rather than historical costs, current costs should be shown on
the books. It may be conceded that in a competitive market current
replacement costs rather than historical costs of individual producers
56. Mfay, supra note 7, at 18-20. See also Consolidated Rock Products Cu. v. Dubuis,
61 Sup. Ct. 675 (U. S. 1941).
57. See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Dubois, 61 Sup. Ct. 675 (U. S. 1941);
1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 156-60, 237 et seq.; C.%Nnii.c: TuE Eco-
NOMIcS OF ACCOUNTANCY (1929) 197-98. 317-18; Littleton, 'ahe and Price in Ac-
counting (1929) 4 AccTG. REv. 147.
58. May, supra note 7, at 20. Henderson, supra note 5, at 448, 455; Frank, .4ccount-
ing for Investors (1939) 7 THE COMpnhOLLF.R 380.
59. The Supreme Court recognized this point in LaBelle Irun Wurks v. United
States, 256 U. S. 377, 393-94 (1921), where it said:
"...*There is a logical incongruity in entering upon the bunks of a corpura-
tion as the capital value of property acquired for permanent employment in its
business and still retained for that purpose, a sum corresponding not to its cost
but to what probably might be realized by sale in the market. It is not merely
that the market value has not been realized or tested by sale made, but that
sale cannot be made without abandoning the very purpose fur which the prop-
erty is held, involving a withdrawval from business so far as that particular prop-
erty is concerned . . ."
See also 2 BONBRIdGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 954-55; May, mipra nute 7, at
18-20.
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determine supply,"' and that supply and demand determine price. Never-
theless, it does not follow that individual producers should revalue their
assets at present replacement costs so that their books may reflect the
effective price determinants. On the contrary, their books are kept to
measure their own income, 1 which is determined by excess of price over
the costs which they have incurred, not the excess of price over costs
which determine price.6" If a particular producer's plant cannot be re-
placed except for a price greatly in excess of its original cost, he is a
low cost producer, and his margin of price over cost will be great. Con-
versely, if his costs are substantially higher than present replacement
costs, he will have little or no margin of price over cost. His position
as a high or low cost producer is reflected by his maintenance of gross
profit margins above or below average margins in the industry over a
period of years. For his own purposes and those of the investors in
his business, the important facts are the costs he charges to the sale
of his product, not the costs of the group of producers as a whole, or
the costs of the marginal producer. Until the fixed assets are sold, any
rise or decline in their value is important only in so far as it is reflected
in the increase or decrease of income over the periods in which the cost
of such assets is amortized. If, on the other hand, a producer revalues
his assets in an attempt to show the effective price determinants, amor-
tization of the amount recorded on the books will overstate his real costs
and understate his true income,0 3 or conversely, understate his real costs
and overstate his true income.
Therefore, from the standpoint of accurate income reporting, the most
useful income statements seem to be those which are based on cost,
and which are supplemented by balance sheets showing costs not yet
charged to operations. Of course, this conclusion does not mean that
earnings statements based on cost provide a direct guide to the value
of the enterprise once a capitalization rate is determined. Value is the
60. DANIELS, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1939) 178-81; Paton, Economic Theory in
Relation to Accounting Valuations (1931) 6 AccTr. REv. 89, 94; Littleton, Value and
Price in Accounting (1929) 4 Accro. REv. 147; cf. Canning, Cost of Production and
Market Price (1931) 6 AccTG. Rnv. 161.
61. ". . . It is the purpose of accounting to record as nearly as possible actual costs
for the individual enterprise . . ." DANIELS, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1939) 179.
62. "Naturally, the actual costs of different companies operating plants made up of
parts purchased at different times and different prices will differ. But is it not the very
function of accounting to show these variations ?" Daniels, The Valuation of Fixed Assets
(1933) 8 Acecr. REv. 302, 310.
63. Corporations which have thus confounded their books have struggled to devise
compensating errors to correct their income accounts. See Daniels, The Valtation of
Fired Assets (1933) 8 Acma. REv. 302; SANDERS, HATFIELD AND MOORE, A STATEMENT
OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (1938) 31-32, 65; COMMITTEE ON ACcoUNTrNG PROCEDURE,
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 5 (1940);
Graham, Valuation for Profit Determination (1940) 15 AccT. Ru'v. 145.
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present worth of future anticipated earnings, and past earnings are signifi-
cant to the investment analyst only in so far as they help predict future
earnings." But the accountant is not an analyst and cannot be expected
to supply all the information on which the analyst bases his conclusions
as to value. Just as the analyst must adjust past results in the light
of forecasts of trends in demands, prices, competitive conditions, and
the non-recurrence of certain items, so he must adjust past earnings
as guides to future earnings in the light of probable changes in the costs
of the particular enterprise. Among these changes may be the replace-
ment of low-cost old plant with high-cost new plant which will require
greater charges to operations. For that reason it may be that the
accountant will want to supply information as to replacement values of
present plant as footnotes or collateral notations on financial statements,
or the management may want to supply information in its published
reports outside the financial statements. Similarly, the management for
its own purposes in determining pricing policies may want to have sup-
plementary records showing replacement costs rather than actual costs.
All such considerations, however, are incidental to the fundamental point
that any estimate of the value of an enterprise must begin with the
record of past earnings, which can be shown only if the financial state-
ments reveal cost.
The ultimate conclusion is that accountants who persist in retaining
the cost convention are not thereby ignoring the need of the lawyer for
information as to value, but are in fact supplying the basic information
from which value can be determined. But, of course, value determination
must remain an inexact science so long as possibilities of conflicting
results exist within the limits of accepted accounting principles.
C. THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE ACCOUNTS IN THE DETERMINATION
OF LEGALLY OPERATIVE FACTS
Even though it is apparent that a financial statement should be
drawn to show legally operative facts, the question of resolving conflicts
which arise from the actual or potential existence of inconsistent finan-
cial statements for the same enterprise still remains.
The possibility of such inconsistency arises primarily because ac-
countants do exercise judgnent in selecting suitable conventions or in
interpreting financial transactions. Not only may accountants at large
64. See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Dubois, 61 Sup. Ct. 675 (U. S. 1941);
Palmer v. Conn. Ry. & Lighting Co., 61 Sup. Ct 379 (U. S. 1941); 1 BOxN]aIG T, VAL-
UATION OF PROPFRTY (1937) 249 et seq. For e.amples of the practical problem of esti-
mating future earnings from past earnings, see Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 7 S. E. C.
456 (1940); Flour Mills of America, Inc., 7 S. E. C. 1 (1940) ; Griess-Pfleger Tanning
Co., 5 S. E. C. 72 (1939) ; La France Industries, 5 S. E. C. 917 (1939).
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differ in these matters but, from the same facts, a particular accountant
may derive different conclusions shaped by the particular interest of
the person for whom he is preparing the financial statement. For example,
the commercial banker will be interested in the ability of an enterprise
to liquidate assets quickly, the executive in matters of internal manage-
ment, the investor in long term prospect: the accountant will wish to
interpret the facts so as to direct the emphasis accordingly."6
Possibilities of diversity also arise out of the fact that public regula-
tory agencies may prescribe different conventions for their several pur-
poses. The courts recognize that the power to regulate accounting goes
beyond mere prescription of the formal titles and break-down of the
accounts, and extends to dictation of the appropriate interpretation of
particular transactions. Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized the
power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to require a railroad to
charge to earnings the entire cost of a railroad line newly replaced and
to capitalize the cost of replacement, instead of charging to capital the
difference between the cost of the improvement and the cost of the line
replaced. 6 Similarly, the Court has upheld an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission requiring a railroad to classify its coal mines
as property not used for carrier purposes rather than as property used
for carrier purposes.
Income taxation creates still a third opportunity for diversity. The
concept of income embodied in the revenue acts is not always identical
65. Originally, accountants emphasized the interpretations which commercial bankers
extending short-term credit placed on the financial condition of the enterprise, with re-
suiting conservatism in balance sheets. Montgomery, Accountants' Limitations (1927)
44 J. OF Accry. 245, 259; Littleton, Value and Price in Accounting (1929) 4 AccTr. REv.
147, 148. See Paton, Aspects of Asset Valuation (1934) 9 ACCTG. REV. 122, 124, deploring
the effect which this emphasis has had on the development of accounting principles. The
present tendency is to emphasize information for the investor, with particular emphasis
on accurate income reporting. PATON AND LIrTLETON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1-3; Staub,
Uniformity in Accounting, in PAPERS ON AcCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEOURu
(1938) ; Frank, Accounting for Investors (1939) 7 THE CoX1rRTRoLLE 380; A Statement
of the Objectives of the American Accounting Ass'n (1936) 11 Accra. REv. 1; May,
Improvement in Financial Accounts (1937) 63 J. OF AccTv. 333, 340 et seq.; Paton, Ac-
counting Problems of the Depression (1932) 7 Accr. REv. 258, 266. To eliminate the
possibilities of ambiguity latent in efforts to make a single set of financial statements
serve all needs, it has been suggested that the "all purpose" balance sheet be recognized
as inadequate, and that different balance sheets be prepared for different purposes. 1 BoN-
BRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 253; CANNING, THE ECONOMICS OF AcCOUNT-
ANCY (1929) 86-88; Brink, The Need for Single-Purpose Statements (1940) 69 J. or
AccTv. 284; Frank, Accounting for Investors (1939) 7 THE COMPTROLLER 380; May,
Eating Peas with Your Knife (1937) 63 J. OF Accry. 15, 17; May, Improvement in
Financial Accounts (1937) 63 J. OF Accry. 333, 337, 367; Montgomery, Accountants'
Limitations (1927) 44 J. OF Accrv. 245, 255, 259; but see Single-Purpose Statements
(1940) 69 J. OF AccrY. 186.
66., Kansas City So. Ry. v. United States, 231 U. S. 423 (1913).
67. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. United States, 287 U. S. 134 (1932).
[Vol. 50: 11801198
ACCOUNTING FACTS AND THE LAW1
with the economic," or accounting,69 or corporation law concept. Thus,
the recent undistributed profits tax penalized the failure to distribute
income, distribution of which might have been unlawful under state
law." Likewise, depreciation may be taken on one basis for tax pur-
poses and on another for general purposes. Again, tax law may not
recognize deductions of certain expenses which lawyers and accountants
recognize as proper charges to income.7' As a consequence of these situa-
tions the taxpayer must frequently keep two or more sets of books.
Where financial statements potentially conflict, problems of adjustment
are inevitable. Where there is no public control of accounting, the key
to the question of the conclusiveness of statements appearing in a cor-
poration's books is the evidentiary rule concerning admissions. 2 But
where a public regulatory agency has prescribed the accounts involved,
the problem may become one of inter-agency conclusiveness. Much liti-
gation seems to have settled one point at least: taxing authorities, oper-
ating under statutory schemes for determining taxable income, are not
bound by the accounting prescribed by other agencies. Thus, the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue need not base his computations of taxable
net income on accounting permitted or prescribed by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission,"3 a state public service commission,74 or a national
bank examiner.75 Likewise, a state is not required to base its system
68. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435 (1934); Weiss v. Wiener,
279 U. S. 333 (1929).
69. Surety Finance Co. v. Comm'r, 77 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 9tb, 1935); Lucas v.
American Code Co., Inc., 280 U. S. 445 (1930); Brown v. Helvering, -291 U. S. 193,
203 (1934) ; Securities Allied Corp v. Comm'r, 95 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
70. See Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling 'Mills, Inc., 61 Sup. Ct. 109 (1940);
PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES iN FEDERAL TAXATON (2d Series 1938) 19-20.
The subject of the divergence of the tax law of income and dividends and the cor-
responding field of corporation law is exhaustively explored in Hills, Federal Taxation
vs. Corporation Law (1937) 12 Wis. L. REv. 280.
71. The diversity of accounts has provoked much criticism. See Healy, Before the
Auditor Comes (mimeographed address, May 15, 1939) 7; PAUL, SELECrED STUDIEs iN
FEDERAL TAXATION (2d series 1938) 19-20; Citizens' National Bank of Orange v.
Comm'r, 74 F. (2d) 604 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
72. Bessemer Investment Co. v. Comm'r, 31 F. (2d) 248 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); see
cases collected in 1 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 6004; cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Helvering, 83 F. (2d) 508 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
73. Old Colony R. R. v. Comm'r, 284 U. S. 552 (1932); Kansas City So. Ry. v.
Comm'r, 52 F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 676 (1931); Chesa-
peake and Ohio Ry. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 7 (E. D. Va. 1933); Minneapolis, St.
P. & S. S. M. Ry., 34 B. T. A. 177 (1936) ; Union Pac. R. R., 26 B. T. A. 1126, 1142
(1932).
74. Fall River Elec. Light Co., 23 B. T. A. 168 (1931).
75. Second Nat. Bank of Philadelphia. 33 B. T. A. 750 (1935), refusing to follow
Citizens' Nat. Bank of Orange v. Comm'r, 74 F. (2d) 604 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935) and
Lebanon Nat. Bank v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 792 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
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of railroad taxation on income as determined by the Interstate Commerce
Commission's classification of accounts.7" And it seems reasonable to
assume that this rule with respect to tax problems will apply to all other
situations outside the field controlled by the particular agency which
prescribes the accounting.
77
The problems of conclusiveness of accounts, prescribed by a regulatory
agency with regard to matters within its own jurisdiction are more
complex. On this point the Supreme Court cases appear confused.
Recently, the Court seems to have indicated that the financial condition
of a company as portrayed by the accounts is not necessarily conclusive
in the determination of regulatory questions. This attitude is best il-
lustrated in Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. United States,8
where the Railway sought to enjoin enforcement of an Interstate Com-
merce Commission order requiring it to classify its coal mines as property
not used for carrier purposes. The Court said:
"With great earnestness the appellant characterizes the order as
in several aspects a denial of due process. . . . But this is to ignore
the fact that the order is one touching accounting merely; that before
any rate base can be ascertained or any basis of recapture determined
the carrier will be entitled to a full hearing as to what property shall
be included; and not until the Commission excludes the assets in
question from the calculation may the carrier assert the infliction
of injury to its rights of property ...
"We are not convinced by the assertion that the necessary effect
of classifying the mines as non-carrier properties is to exclude them
from consideration as capital in the issuance of securities .
the mere accounting classification can conclude neither the Com-
mission nor the appellant upon the hearing of an application under
§ 20a(2) ...
"Appellant also characterizes the Commission's action as a denial
of the legal right of the railway to adopt fair and reasonable methods
of accounting. . . . But there is no right to a particular form of
accounting as such." 79
76. Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Daughton, 262 U. S. 413 (1923).
77. The writer, however, knows of no cases other than tax cases which involve such
situations.
78. 287 U. S. 134 (1932).
79. 287 U. S. 134, 141-43 (1932). Italics supplied. See also Telephone and Railroad
Depreciation' Charges, 177 I. C. C. 351, 381 (1931) ; n re Classification of Accounts of
Gas and Electric Companies, P. U. R. 1921D 385, 386 (Mass. D. P. U., 1921) ; Re New
York & Richmond Gas Company, 23 P. U. R. (N.s.) 463 (N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
1938) ; Re Uniform Classification of Accounts for Electric Utilities, 14 P. U. R. (x.s.) 57
(N. H. Pub. Serv. Comm., 1936). Note that the conclusion of the Norfolk & Western
case was reached although carriers are forbidden by statute [41 STAT. 493 (1920), 49
U. S. C. § 20(5) (1934)] to keep any accounts other than those prescribed by the Com-
mission.
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In State Corporation Commission of Kansas v. Wichita Gas Com-
pany,s° the Commission prohibited gas distributing companies from
recording on their books as expenses any payments made to an affiliated
pipe line company in excess of thirty cents per thousand cubic feet. A
three judge federal court enjoined enforcement of the order. The
Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that, irrespective of the
merits of the order, no injunction should have issued unless the com-
pany could prove irreparable injury. Since the findings and directions
of the Commission were held to be merely legislative in character,
designed only to secure information8 1 and thus not binding on the com-
panies in subsequent rate proceedings, no present injury was found and
the injunction was vacated. This case indicates clearly that accounting
orders are not conclusive in subsequent rate litigation.
Neither the Supreme Court nor any other courts have recognized that
these two cases apparently abandoned a position which the Court had
earlier assumed in one of its leading cases on accounting, Kansas City
Southern Railway Company v. United States.8 2 In that case the railway
sued to enjoin enforcement of a regulation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission which would have required it to charge to earnings the
entire cost of a railroad line which had been recently replaced. The
railway showed that it had been cheaper to build a new line than to
improve the old line, and that, if the old line had been improved, the
entire cost of that improvement could have been charged to capital, with
no charge to operating expenses. Since, under the accounting procedure
prescribed, the railway's books showed no operating income during the
year in which the replacements were made, the railway could declare
no dividends for that year on its preferred stock, which was non-cumu-
lative. Moreover, this regulation prevented the railway from carrying
the full cost of the improvements as an asset to balance the bond liability
incurred to finance the improvements.
But the regulation was upheld against the contention that it impaired
substantive rights. The Court did not question that substantive rights
were involved; on the contrary, it definitely assumed that the prescribed
accounting treatment was conclusive for all purposes, and precluded
the payment of dividends. It said:
"The preferred stockholders as such are not before the court,
and this is not a proper occasion for determining their rights. Sup-
posing, however, that the enforcement of the accounting system does
require them to forego their current dividends, we do not concede
that this amounts to an unlawful taking of their property."83
80. 290 U. S. 561 (1934).
81. On this point, see also ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 (1912).
82. 231 U. S. 423 (1913).
83. 231 U. S. 423, 453 (1913). The Court's attitude vas not dependent solely on
its expressed agreement with the principle of the regulation, for it went on to say:
1941] 1201
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The question whether the accounting methods prescribed by the Com-
mission were conclusive for dividend purposes was not directly in issue
in the Kansas City Southern case. But the case embodied a considered
dictum which has been cited in other cases to demonstrate that accounting
controls matters of substance. Thus, it was cited by the three judge
district court in the Norfolk & Western case in support of the following
language:
"Accounting under the order of the Commission is not merely a
matter of form, but one of substance. It sets forth the condition
of public carriers for the information of their stock and bondholders
and the investing public as well as for that of the Commission. It
furnishes the basis for corporate financing and many other matters
affecting their very existence. . . ."84
Some lower federal courts, reflecting the confusion of the Supreme
Court decisions in regard to the conclusiveness of regulatory accounting
orders, have differed as to the proper jurisdictional theory for the judicial
review of such orders. Two district court cases have assumed that
jurisdiction exists because accounting orders relate to substance.", The
Supreme Court itself has never spoken directly on the point. But the
Court's conclusion in the Wichita Gas case that an accounting order was
merely legislative in nature was buttressed by citing United States v.
Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railway Company,80 which had held that
because the order was legislative in nature, an order of the Interstate
"But, did we agree with appellant that the abandonments ought to be charged to sur-
plus or to profit and loss, rather than to operating expenses, we still should not decm this
a sufficient ground to declare that the Commission had abused its power. So long as it
acts fairly and reasonably within the grant of power constitutionally conferred by Con-
gress, its orders are not open to judicial review." Id. at 456-7. The Court reasoned that
the regulatory power of the Commission was over the corporate entity, and could not be
defeated by agreements of the stockholders inter sese as to the disposition of profits,
Such reasoning could not advance the Court very far, however, for precisely the same
basic questions would have been presented if the corporation had had only one class of
stockholders on whose behalf it complained that the regulation deprived it of the right
to declare dividends.
84. Italics supplied. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 967, 970
(W. D. Va. 1931). As has been pointed out,-the Supreme Court decision in this case
held that accounting orders deal with "accounting merely." See also Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 7 (E. D. Va. 1933) ; New York Edison Co. v. Maltble,
244 App. Div. 685, 281 N. Y. Supp. 223 (3d Dep't 1935), questions ccrtified, 245 App.
Div. 897, 282 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1935), aff'd, 271 N. Y. 103, 2 N. E. (2d) 277 (1936) ;
People ex rel. New York Rys. v. Public Serv. Comm., 223 N. Y. 373, 119 N. E. 848
(1918) ; Passaic Consolidated Water Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Conum'rs, 5 N. J. Misc.
1078, 139 Atl. 324 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd without opinion by a court divided 6 to 5, 104
N. J. Law 666, 141 At]. 921 (1928).
85. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 967 (W. D. Va. 1931); Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 7 (E. D. Va. 1933).
86. 273 U. S. 299 (1927).
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Commerce Commission determining a final valuation under Section 19 (a)
of the Interstate Commerce Act8 7 was not reviewable even under a statute
authorizing review of that Commission's orders.ss If accounting orders
are in fact merely legislative, the Los Angeles case would appear to
preclude review. But the Supreme Court has reviewed accounting orders.82
It has been suggested, however, that since violation of such orders is
punishable,90 they must be reviewable without regard to the issue of
the conclusiveness of accounting orders in litigation of substantive mat-
ters.91
The rules of law that will emerge from the existing welter of decisions
- which demonstrate only that the courts have not clearly analyzed the
problem of conclusiveness-are, of course, not predictable with certainty.
It is probable, however, that in matters relating to the interpretation of
financial events, prescribed accounting will be conclusive for all purposes
within the jurisdiction of the regulatory agency which prescribes it.
Where the agency has direct regulatory power to deal with the par-
ticular problem involved, this is clear: no agency would stultify its
regulatory powers by directing that financial events be interpreted on
the books in a manner inconsistent with their treatment for other regu-
latory purposes. But in matters relating to "confiscation," prescribed
accounting will not be conclusive, for the courts will make their own
determinations as to value and expense.
Unlike agencies with comprehensive regulatory powers, the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the two securities acts 2 has no statu-
tory purposes to achieve with respect to the financial statements of
corporations beyond requiring full and truthful disclosure. 3 It is clear,
nonetheless, that Congress intended the Commission to exercise such
control over accounting as would insure accurate disclosure and
make the accounts of different companies comparable."4 To make this
87. 37 STAT. 701 (1913), 49 U. S. C. § 19a (1934).
88. Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 ST. 203 (1913), 28 U.S.C. §41 (28) (1934).
89. ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 (1912); Kancas City So. Ry. v.
United States, 231 U. S. 423 (1913) ; Norfolk & IN. P. R. v. United States, 287 U. S.
134 (1932); Am. Tel. and Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232 (1936).
90. Atlanta, B. & C. R. R. v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 885, 887 (N. D. Ga. 1928).
91. As to penalties for disobedience of accounting orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, see 34 STAr. 594 (1906), 35 STAT. 648 (1909), 49 U. S. C. § 20 (6) and (7)
(1934). As to orders of the Federal Communications Commission, see 48 STAT. 1078
(1934), 47 U. S. C. § 220(d) (1934).
92. Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77a cl seq. (1934);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §78 (1934).
93. The relevant provisions of the Securities Act are §§ 7 and 19(a) and schedule A,
items 25 and 26. The relevant provisions of the Securities Exchange Act are §§ 3(b),
12(b), 13(b) and 23(a).
94. See Hearings before Committce on Interstate and Foreign Commnterce on H. R.
7852 and H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 652-53; 15, 16 Hearings on Stock Er-
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uniformity possible, Congress deliberately refrained from requiring
that the accounting prescribed by the Commission be consistent with
accounting prescribed by state law." This freedom of action has enabled
the Commission to require adherence to accounting standards in financial
statements filed with it even when state law permitted other treatment. 0
But, generally, the Commission has no control over the accounting of
a registrant for purposes of internal management other than reports to
the CommissionY Although no case has arisen on this point, it seems
clear that a registrant will not be concluded by the accounts it files with
the Commission, except where the evidentiary rule of admissions is
applicable.
Two hypothetical examples will illustrate the problems which may
consequently arise:
For instance, should a registrant accept the Commission's view that
a particular item should be charged to earned surplus rather than capital
surplus in reports filed with the Commission, no earned surplus might
remain available for dividends."8 Yet, if on its own books the registrant
should charge the item to capital surplus and pay a dividend out of earned
surplus, it seems evident that in a suit against the registrant's officers
and directors for unlawful declaration of dividends, a report filed with
the Commission showing no earned surplus should not be conclusive
evidence of improper accounting treatment.0 9
Again, if a financial statement filed under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 shows fixed assets at cost less depreciation, although the
assets be "worth" more than cost, the registrant should not be liable
under Section 18(a)" °° for failing to disclose value to a stockholder
change Practices before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1934) 6532-33, 6537, 6690-91, 6693, 6698-99, 7175, 7182, 7521.
95. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before Senate Comnittee on Bankint
ad Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1934) 7599-7601; 78 CONG. REC. 8033, 8282, 8284,
8567 (1934).
96. See SEC Accounting Series Release No. 16, March 16, 1940.
97. This limitation, deducible from the language of both statutes, was expressly
pointed out in the Senate Report on the Securities Exchange Act. SENT. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 10. See Kaplan and Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to Stockhold-
ers, and the SEC (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 935, for a study of the extent to which corporate
reports to stockholders adhere to the requirements imposed by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission for reports filed with it.
98. This assumes that capital surplus is not available for dividends under applicable
state law.
99. Doubtless, however, the report filed with the Commission should show the con-
dition of the corporation's own books, in order not to conceal facts which affect the avail-
ability of dividends.
100. Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15
U. S. C. § 78r(a) (1934) provides that any person who files a report which is misleading
as to a material fact shall be liable to any person who purchased or sold a security at a
price which was affected by such statement for damages caused by the reliance.
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who made a computation of the value of his stock from the report and
sold it at a price determined accordingly. This result should follow even
in states where the increased value could have been made the foundation
for a write-up which would create a revaluation surplus available for
dividends.
In summary, it appears probable that, except for the use of the
accounting prescribed by a regulatory agency as evidence of facts in
matters arising within the purview of that agency's regulatory powers,
the financial statements of an enterprise will conclude neither the enter-
prise nor persons nor public agencies which deal with it. Such statements
will be considered to be essentially purposive - rebuttable by challenging
the applicability of the conventions or assumptions upon which they were
based to the problem at hand.
